The deployment of a new African mission to Somalia officially started on January 1, but it is unclear whether neighbouring Ethiopia will be involved.
This comes as it emerged that both Somalia and Ethiopia are engaged in mind games over the new troop deployment, courtesy of the mistrust brought about by the latter’s sea access agreement with the breakaway region of Somaliland in January 2024.
Somalia has known since June last year that Ethiopia will not be part of the newly established African Union Support and Stabilization Mission in Somalia (AUSSOM) unless it revokes the sea access agreement with Somaliland.
Yet, a new truce brokered by Turkey on December 12 between the two countries is sending mixed signals.
On the one hand, Somalia argues that it still maintains that the Ankara agreement has not changed its stance that Ethiopia must first revoke its Memorandum of Understanding (MOU)with Somaliland to build a military base at the Red Sea port of Berbera.
On the other hand, Ethiopia is oozing confidence that the Ankara agreement has solved the year-long diplomatic standoff, but without explaining whether it had agreed to forgo the deal with Somaliland in exchange for better relations with Somalia.
Both countries committed to collaborating in Ankara on bilateral agreements and economic arrangements that would guarantee Ethiopia’s sustained, safe, and dependable access to the sea “under the sovereign authority of the Federal Republic of Somalia.”
They will now initiate technical talks no later than the end of February, which are to be completed “within four months”.
In the meantime, the threat by Al-Shabaab cannot wait for diplomacy since the mandate of the former African Union Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS) expired on December 31, 2024.
Somalia is sending mixed signals. According to National Security Advisor Hussein Sheikh Ali. Ethiopia will no longer have a military presence in Somalia or take part in AUSSOM unless it first revokes the contentious sea access deal with the breakaway Somaliland area.
This was followed by a statement by Somalia’s Defence Minister, Abdulkadir Mohamed Nur that Ethiopia’s former position in Somalia has been given to other countries.
Yet, Somalia’s Foreign Affairs Minister, Ahmed Moalim Fiqi—after meeting Ethiopian Defence Minister Aisha Mohammed in Mogadishu on January 3—said that the diplomatic dispute between Ethiopia and Somalia that had led to tense regional relations has been resolved.
Ethiopia still maintains over 3,000 troops in Somalia despite an ultimatum to quit by December 31, 2024—which analysts say would amount to an occupation force.
The irony is that while Somalia wants Ethiopia troops out of its territory, President Hassan Sheikh Mohamoud’s administration is looking to Ethiopia for assistance in ousting Ahmed Madobe, the president of Jubaland, who has the support of Ethiopia and Kenya.
AUSSOM will comprise 12,626 troops, including 1,040 police. Somali officials had previously announced the successful procurement of 11,000 troops from Uganda, Djibouti, and Kenya for AUSSOM.
Another headache emerged after Burundi—one of the previous TCCs—withdrew AUSSOM on grounds that Somalia had allocated Burundi 1,041 soldiers, less than the 2,000 Burundi had offered to contribute.
The Burundi National Defence Forces (BNDF) termed it as a “Betrayal” by Somalia, given that the country has been in Somalia since 2007, the second country to deploy after Uganda under AMISOM. At one time Burundi deployed up to 5,400 troops.
Somalia had made a contingency plan to fill the gap with other troops from Egypt and Eritrea in the absence of Ethiopia and Burundi.
Egypt, for instance, has pledged to contribute 5,000 to AUSSOM (which could be the largest contribution from one country) plus an additional 5,000 as part of a bilateral security arrangement between the two countries, which would support the Somalia National Army (SNA).
With the entry of Egypt, the reconstitution of the African mission in Somalia is now turning into a geopolitical power game.
Egypt is eager to lure Somalia not only for its military and diplomatic foothold in The Horn but also to use the deployment of its troops as a chess game regarding its dispute with Addis Ababa over the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD)
Egypt perceives the 6,450 MW hydropower project as an existential threat given that 80 percent of its water supply from the River Nile comes from the Blue Nile in Ethiopia.
Addis Ababa on the other hand saw the presence of over 10,000 troops in neighbouring Somalia as a potential threat to the dam, given that Egypt had over the years threatened military option if Ethiopia did not stop the development of GERD.
Besides, Ethiopia is not willing to let go of its military presence in Somalia because of long-standing security threats. Despite having been a contributor to the defunct AMISOM and ATMIS, Ethiopia always mainlined over 4,000 troops outside the AU missions.
Ethiopia regards Somalia as a security hotspot and keeps troops inside Somalia to deter Al-Shabaab from routinely performing cross-border incursions and terrorist strikes.
Secondly, many ethnic Somali populations reside in Ethiopia, especially in the Somali Regional State (also called the Ogaden region). In order to protect Ethiopia’s territorial integrity, the Ethiopian government fears that turbulence in Somalia may incite separatist movements or foster cross-border cooperation among Somali communities.
Thirdly, Ethiopia and Somalia have historical tension that dates back to the Ogaden War (1977–1978), in which Somalia attempted to capture Ethiopia’s Somali-inhabited areas. While the circumstances have changed, Ethiopia remains apprehensive of any rise of Somali irredentism.
